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This paper presents models that explain why merchants accept payment cards even when 
the fees they face exceed the transactional benefits they receive from a card transaction. 
Such merchant behaviors can be explained by competition among merchants and/or the 
effectiveness of the merchant’s card acceptance in shifting cardholders’ demand for 
goods upward. The prevalent assumption used in payment card literature—merchants 
accept cards only when their transactional benefits are higher than the fees they pay—
holds only for a monopoly merchant who faces an inelastic consumer demand. A card 
network that wants all merchants in a given industry to accept cards sets a lower 
merchant fee initially and then gradually increases it to the highest possible level, which 
may be higher than the sum of the merchant’s transactional benefit and the merchant’s 
initial margin without cards. Such merchant fees potentially create inequality between 
cardholders and non-cardholders.  
 
                                                 
1Fumiko Hayashi is a senior economist in the Payments System Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, 925 Grand Boulevard, Kansas City, MO, 64198, e-mail:fumiko-hayashi@kc.frb.org, Phone: (816) 881-
6851. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Federal Reserve System.    2
1. Introduction 
Credit and debit card payments are experiencing rapid growth. This rapid growth in card 
payments is attracting controversy and antitrust scrutiny in many countries. Recently, the 
European Commission and the Reserve Bank of Australia have issued their decisions on pricing 
of card payments.
2 Regulatory authorities in other countries, such as Mexico and the United 
Kingdom, are evaluating potential future regulations. At the center of those policymakers’ 
attention are interchange fees, which are paid by the bank (called the acquirer) that processes the 
card transaction for the merchant to the bank (called the issuer) that has issued the payment card 
to the consumer. Interchange fees are typically set by the card network (or by its member 
financial institutions collectively) and in many instances they are considered by regulators to be 
too high. 
Chart 1 shows the credit card interchange rates in Australia and the European Union 
(EU), before and after the reductions of interchange rates were forced. In these regions, the 
regulator’s involvements on pricing of card payments lowered the credit card interchange rates 
significantly. The chart also includes the UK credit card interchange rates. In the United 
Kingdom, the antitrust authority has not decided whether it will regulate the credit card 
interchange rates.
3 But if it does, then some industry observers anticipate the rates will be cut to 
0.7 percent or below.
4 Current U.S. credit card interchange rates are also included in the chart. 
As seen in the chart, the U.S. interchange rates are even higher than the rates in the three regions 
before the interchange rates were lowered.  
                                                 
2While the Reserve Bank of Australia has regulated the credit card interchange rates, the European Commission has 
issued its decision to exempt Visa’s interchange fees under European competition laws. Visa has voluntarily reduced 
its interchange rates for cross-boarder transactions within certain European Union countries. 
3According to The Herald, November 11, 2004, a spokesman of the UK antitrust authority said “we would hope to 
issue a decision by the summer of next year.” 
4Industry observers expect the interchange rates in the United Kingdom to be between 0.35 to 0.7 percent. See, for 
example, The Times, May 17, 2004 and November 11, 2004, and Financial Times, November 11, 2004.    3















Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia, Visa Europe, MasterCard International, and American Banker 
Notes: “Before” = before the rate was forced to be lowered; “After” = after the rate was lowered; “Current” = 
as of November, 2004. In Australia, the regulation is effective for both Visa and MasterCard. The ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ rates are the average of Visa and MasterCard rates. In the EU, the European Commission made its 
decision on the Visa rate for cross-boarder transactions only. The ‘before’ rate is not publicly available, but 
the rate was estimated at about 1 percent according to the report “Credit Card Services” by the UK 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission and others. In the United Kingdom, the antitrust authority has not 
made a final decision on the credit card interchange rates as of November 2004. Therefore, the ‘after’ rate is 
an expectation by industry observers. They predict the regulated interchange rate will be between 0.35 to 0.7 
percent. (See footnote 4.) The U.S. rate is the average of Visa and MasterCard rates. 












Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia, Visa Europe, MasterCard International, and ATM & Debit News 
Notes: In Australia, there are no Visa/MasterCard online debit products. The domestic debit network’s 
interchange fees are paid by issuers to acquirers. For the EU, only cross-boarder debit products are listed. In 
the United Kingdom, the domestic debit network and MasterCard agreed in 2002 that the domestic products 
will be migrated into Maestro, the MasterCard online debit product by 2007. The rates shown were the 1998 
rates. In the United States, there exist more than ten domestic online debit networks. The rate shown as 
domestic debit network is the weighted average of the top three domestic online debit interchange fees. To 
convert the currencies, the average exchange rates for the first three quarters of 2004 are used.    4
Chart 2 shows the debit card interchange fees in selected countries. Interchange fees for 
offline debit are higher than those for online debit.
5 In Australia, the online debit interchange 
fees go in the opposite direction—paid by the issuer to the acquirer. Although the chart does not 
include them, many countries have domestic debit schemes with zero interchange fees.
6 Similar 
to credit card interchange fees, debit card interchange fees in the United States are among the 
highest in the world. 
In the United States, interchange fees for both credit and debit card transactions are 
among the highest in the world. Moreover, they have been increasing very rapidly for the past 
several years. Chart 3 shows the various interchange fees for a $50 transaction at a retail store in 
the United States. Interchange fees for credit and online debit transactions have been increasing. 
Although the offline debit interchange rates were reduced after the settlement of a lawsuit by a 
group of merchants against the two offline debit networks in August 2003, they have increased 
since 2004. 


















Sources: American Banker and ATM & Debit News 
                                                 
5See Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2003) for the difference between online and offline debit. 
6Those include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland.   5
Since interchange fees are a component of merchant fees charged by acquirers, increases 
in interchange fees result in increases in merchant fees. More and more merchants have 
expressed their concerns with the fees and some even argue that the current fee level exceeds the 
benefits they receive in accepting cards. However, few merchants have stopped accepting card 
payments. 
Two interesting questions arise from the experience of the U.S. payments industry. First, 
why have interchange fees been increasing despite the fact that the payments industry 
experienced technological advances and intensified competition? A variety of sources reported 
that technological advances have reduced the costs of processing card transactions.
7 Since one of 
the rationales for the interchange fee is to cover the issuer’s costs for providing card services, the 
reduction of some of their costs may reduce the fees. Intensified competition has been observed 
among card networks, issuers, acquirers, and processors, although some of them have greater 
market power than the others.
8  
Traditional economic theories suggest that technological advances and competition will 
reduce prices. Since the payment industry is characterized as a two-sided market, some of the 
traditional theories that analyze one-sided markets are not applicable.
9 Nevertheless, previous 
literature on payment card networks predicts that network competition will reduce interchange 
fees and/or merchant fees.
10  
                                                 
7See, for example, Evans and Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic, the MIT Press, 1999, p. 130, ATM & Debit News, 
February 12, 2004, and April 22, 2004, and “Murky Future for Interchange” European Card Review, 
September/October 2004.  
8In the ruling in the Department of Justice’s antitrust case against Visa and MasterCard, the court found that these 
two card networks have market power in payment card markets. United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, United States of America v. Visa USA, Visa International Corp, and MasterCard, August Term, 2002. 
9See, for example, Evans (2001) for the difference between one-sided and two-sided markets. 
10Studies that analyze competition among card networks include Manenti and Somma (2002), Bolt (2003), Guthrie 
and Wright (2003), and Rochet and Tirole (2003).    6
The second question is why merchants are accepting card payments even when merchant 
benefits in accepting cards are not higher than the fees they face. Merchants explain that the 
competitive pressure does not allow them to reject card payments and if they do so, they lose 
sales. Card networks, on the other hand, claimed that the benefits merchants receive today are 
greater than those in the past since card networks provide useful customer information that 
merchants can use to increase their profits. Therefore, the networks reason, merchants receive 
more benefits than fees (even though the fees today are higher than in the past), and if not they 
can drop their card acceptance. The networks also claimed that because of network externalities, 
payment cards generate more benefits since the number of merchants that accept payment cards 
has increased. 
The literature on payment cards has been growing, but only a few studies have analyzed 
merchant card acceptance. Most studies simply assume either that merchants accept cards when 
their transactional benefits from cards exceed the merchant fees or that merchants accept cards 
regardless of the level of merchant fees.
11 Therefore, one cannot use these models to answer the 
second question above. Some exceptions are Rochet and Tirole (2002), Chakravorti and To 
(2003), and Wright (2003b). Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2003b) have found that if 
merchants compete against each other, they accept cards as long as the merchant fees do not 
exceed the sum of the merchant’s transactional benefits and the cardholder’s average net 
transactional benefits from cards. Chakravorti and To (2003) focus on the credit card’s revolving 
function and explain that competing merchants accept credit cards because it allows them to 
make sales to illiquid customers today rather than to wait for uncertain sales tomorrow. Their 
                                                 
11Models with the assumption that merchants only accept cards when their transactional benefits from cards exceed 
the fees include Baxter (1983), Schmalensee (2002), Bolt and Tieman (2003), and Wright (2003a, 2004). In contrast, 
Frankel (1998), Gans and King (2002), Katz (2001), and Schwartz and Vincent (2003) assume that merchants accept 
cards regardless of the level of merchant fees.   7
model also concludes that although each merchant chooses to accept cards, since all merchants 
accept cards in equilibrium each merchant’s profit is lower.  
Chakravorti and To (2003) explain the merchants’ credit card acceptance but do not 
explain their debit card acceptance. The models by Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2003b) 
explain both credit and debit card acceptance by merchants even when merchant fees are higher 
than their transactional benefits. In Wright (2003b), merchants can increase their profit margins 
by accepting cards, which contradicts what some of the merchants are saying. In contrast, in 
Rochet and Tirole (2002), merchants cannot increase their margins by accepting cards. Their 
model, however, expects that the maximum merchant fee decreases as competition among 
issuers intensifies, which seems contrary to the experience in the United States.
12 
Understanding merchant card acceptance behavior may be a key in answering the first 
question. As mentioned, no previous literature is successful in explaining that network 
competition raises the interchange fees. This is so, partly because most of the studies assume that 
merchants accept cards only when the merchant fees do not exceed their transactional benefits, 
and partly because most of them do not model issuers’ behavior when the issuers decide which 
networks they will join.  
This paper analyzes the merchant incentives to accept payment cards—both credit and 
debit cards. Four different markets that are characterized by merchant competitiveness 
(monopoly or a Hotelling model of competition) and by price elasticity of the market aggregate 
consumer demand (inelastic or elastic) are considered in turn. The results suggest that only 
monopoly merchants who are facing an inelastic consumer demand do not accept cards if the 
                                                 
12While the top ten credit card issuers’ market share in terms of managed receivable is high and has increased from 
79.4 percent in 2000 to 85.7 percent in 2003, the top ten debit card issuers’ market share is low and steady. 
According to EFT Data Book (various years), both the online and offline debit issuers’ market shares either in terms 
of number of cards issued or in terms of transaction volume have been around 30 to 35 percent since 2000.    8
fees exceed the merchant’s transactional benefits. In the other three markets, merchants accept 
cards even when the fees exceed their transactional benefits. As previous studies found, 
competing merchants accept cards for strategic reasons. Merchants initially hope that their card 
acceptance can lure customers away from their rivals, but later on they accept cards to keep their 
current customers. Even monopoly merchants accept cards when their transactional benefits are 
lower than the fees they pay if they face an elastic consumer demand. They do so not because 
they have a strategic reason but because card acceptance shifts their cardholder customers’ 
demand upward.  
In the model, there is one card network that determines both the merchant fees and 
cardholder fee.
13 The network is assumed to be conservative in the sense that it sets a merchant 
fee so that all of the merchants in a given industry accept cards. If the merchants’ price setting is 
completely flexible, the network will set the highest possible merchant fees from the first period 
in the markets with a monopoly merchant, while the network will set lower merchant fees in the 
first period and will raise them to the highest possible merchant fees in the second period in the 
markets of the Hotelling competition. In reality, however, merchants are unwilling to raise their 
prices by a large amount over a short period.
14 In such cases, the network will set a merchant fee 
lower in earlier periods of card acceptance in a given industry, and it will gradually increase the 
fee as more periods have passed after the industry first adopts card payments. 
The paper also analyzes the welfare of cardholders, non-cardholders, and merchants 
separately because policymakers may want to evaluate the card pricing from both an efficiency 
and equity point of view. To reflect realty, the model assumes that merchants set the same price 
                                                 
13In most networks, merchant fees are determined by each individual acquirer and cardholder fees are determined by 
each individual issuer. However, the fees do not vary very much by acquirer or issuer. 
14See, for example, Rotemberg (2004).   9
for card users and cash users.
15 Under this pricing, in comparison with an equilibrium without 
cards, if the network charges the highest merchant fee then cardholders are better off (or at least 
indifferent), non-cardholders are worse off, and merchants are either better off or indifferent. In 
the long run, however, the total of the consumers’ and merchants’ surplus will gradually decrease 
as the network raises the merchant fees. In particular, in markets where aggregate consumer 
demands are inelastic, the total of the consumers’ and merchants’ surplus will converge to the 
total of the consumers’ and merchants’ surplus without cards at all.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 
presents results of four different cases in turn, and section 4 concludes.  
2. The model 
For simplicity, only two payment instruments are available in the model. They are card 
and cash. Each industry is small enough so that the card acceptance by the merchants in the 
industry does not affect the consumer’s cardholding decision and therefore a fixed (α) percent of 
the customers for the industry hold a card.  
A card transaction brings transactional benefits to both the card users and the merchants 
who accept those cards. One of the transactional benefits of cards is reducing transactional costs 
associated with cash transactions for both consumers and merchants. When consumers pay with 
cash, the consumers incur some transactional costs besides the price of goods or services they 
purchase and the merchants also incur some transactional costs in addition to the costs of selling 
goods or services. Generally, transactional costs with cash for consumers include costs of 
obtaining cash (such as ATM fees and time to go to the bank) and risks associated with cash 
                                                 
15Due to no-surcharge rules imposed by card networks.   10
(such as theft); those for merchants include handling cash transactions (such as costs of labor, 
armed car, and bank fees).  
Some transactions require more costs to consumers and merchants if they are paid by 
cash. Think about the transactions that require reservations, such as a hotel reservation. Although 
the reservation may not be impossible with cash, cash is inconvenient if a customer wants a late 
arrival guarantee as well as an ability to cancel the reservation without paying fees. The hotel 
may want some advance payments from the cash customer to keep the room until he or she 
arrives, but it may hesitate to do so since it needs to send the cash back on the chance that if the 
customer cancels before the date that a cancellation fee is assessed. So, either the cash customer 
cannot obtain a late arrival guarantee or the hotel may loose business should the cash customer 
not show up. Card payment can diminish such inconvenience or loss. At the time of reservation, 
a card customer gives the hotel his or her card number. If the card customer cancels the 
reservation earlier, the hotel does not charge anything to the customer’s card account. The hotel 
can keep the room until he or she arrives, but in case the customer did not show up without 
canceling the reservation, the hotel can simply charge a cancellation fee to the account.  
Although there may exist some other transactional benefits of cards, the model assumes 
that card transactions reduce both card users’ and merchants’ transactional costs to zero but 
create no other transactional benefits to either merchants or card users. Card transactions require 
per transaction fees to cardholders,  f , (if rewards instead of fees, then  f  is negative) and to 
merchants, m . For consumers, the true cost of purchasing a good or service is  c t p +  with cash 
and  f p +  with a card, where  p  is the product price charged by the merchant and  c t  is the 
transactional cost for cash users. For merchants, the true cost of selling a good or service is 
m t d +  with cash and  m d +  with a card, where d  is the cost of selling a product regardless of   11
the payment methods used for the transaction and  m t  is the merchant’s transactional costs with 
cash. 
Assume that transactional costs with cash for consumers and merchants do not vary by 
each individual consumer or merchant but vary by industry. Thus, consumers who purchase 
goods from the same industry incur the same transactional costs with cash, and merchants who 
are in the same industry incur the same transactional costs with cash. Some empirical evidence 
can justify this assumption. The consumer payment study by Dove Consulting (2001) showed 
that the consumers’ payment mix varies by the type of store. Hayashi and Klee (2003) also found 
that a consumer’s payment choice depends on the transaction characteristics, such as average 
transaction value and physical characteristics at the points of purchase. Although larger 
merchants in a given industry may pay lower merchant fees than their smaller counterparts, 
typically in the U.S. merchant fees vary by a type of industries.
16 This assumption is also adopted 
by some of the previous studies. Wright (2004) assumes that card benefits vary by industry. 
Wright (2000) and Katz (2001) assume that without cards, some of the transactions extract the 
consumer’s entire surplus. Such transactions may happen only in particular industries.  
Merchants are assumed to set the same price for cash users and card users. The network 
imposes the no-surcharge rule, which prohibits merchants from charging a higher price to card 
users. Although the rule does not prohibit merchants from giving cash discounts, merchants 
likely choose to set the same prices since setting different prices may be costly.
17 In some 
                                                 
16Both credit card networks and debit card networks in the United States set different interchange fees according to 
industry types. Typically, debit card networks have two fees: one for supermarkets and the other for non-
supermarkets. Visa and MasterCard credit card networks set different fees for different categories of industry, such 
as supermarkets, general retail markets, emerging retail markets, hotel and car rentals, automated fuel dispenser, and 
so on. 
17Setting different prices may increase some administration costs or customer dissatisfaction.   12
countries, a surcharge has been allowed, but only a small percentage of merchants actually set 
different prices for card users and the rest of the consumers.
18  
Four different cases are analyzed and these four are characterized by consumer demand 
for goods—either elastic or inelastic—and merchant market competitiveness—either monopoly 
or competition according to the Hotelling model. Each industry faces either an elastic or inelastic 
aggregate consumer demand for goods. In the industry that faces an elastic demand, the 
consumer’s quantity demanded depends on the consumer’s true costs of purchasing goods or 
services rather than the price itself. Let us think about the hotel industry again. As explained 
above, making reservations with cash will likely be more costly for both customers and hotels 
than that with cards. Since cards reduce such transactional costs for customers, even when the 
price of the hotel stay does not change, there will either be more travelers or the current travelers 
will travel more. Industries that face inelastic demand, on the other hand, cannot shift industry 
aggregate demand by simply accepting payment cards. The consumer home appliances industry 
is an example of this. Each household needs at most a certain number of refrigerators or washers 
and dryers. Since these are large-dollar items, accepting cards reduces the consumer’s risk or 
inconvenience associated with cash transactions. However, the consumers do not buy more 
refrigerators or washers and dryers because the merchants accept card payments. To simplify the 
analysis, each individual cardholder’s and each individual non-cardholder’s demand functions 
are assumed to be identical.
19  
In each industry, there is either a monopoly merchant or two merchants competing 
according to the Hotelling model. Merchants decide not only their card acceptance strategy but 
also their prices. Merchants are assumed to face some restrictions when they adjust their prices 
                                                 
18Those countries include Australia, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.   13
upward, since they may be afraid of antitrust scrutiny or customers’ dissatisfaction toward their 
price increases.
20 In the model, merchants can increase their prices with at most the growth rate 
of i in the period. i is an industry specific and is a random draw from the range of  ] , 0 [ i  each 
period. i is realized after the network sets the merchant fee and before the merchants set their 
prices. 
The model assumes that there exists only one card network, which sets both merchant 
fees and the cardholder fee.
21 The network sets a unique merchant fee in a given industry and a 
universal cardholder fee. Although a variety of network objectives, such as maximizing the total 
members’ profits, balancing the profits or costs between acquirers and issuers, or maximizing the 
total transaction volume, are suggested, since the paper focuses on the merchant card acceptance 
behavior, the network is assumed to have an incentive to set merchant fees as high as possible. 
The network is also assumed to be conservative when it sets merchant fees. It sets a merchant fee 
so that all of the merchants in a given industry accept cards. When the network sets the merchant 
fee, however, it cannot observe the realized maximum price growth rate, so it conservatively 
predicts that the growth rate of the price is zero. 
It is assumed that consumers are either cardholders or non-cardholders. Non-cardholders 
need to pay with cash all the time. On the other hand, cardholders can choose their payment 
method—either cash or a card. Consumers observe all the decisions the merchants made (card 
acceptance and new price) before they determine their payment methods, the merchants from 
which they make purchases, and quantities (if demand is elastic).  
                                                                                                                                                             
19This assumption may not be realistic. The average income of credit card holders is higher than the average income 
of non-credit card holders. Thus demand functions are likely different.  
20In the United States, the recent growth of interchange fees of credit and major debit card networks has outpaced 
the growth of consumer prices in some industries. For example, Consumer Price Indices (CPI) for household 
furnishing and apparels have declined for the last five years, and the growth rate of CPI for public transportation or 
for recreation is lower than the growth rate of interchange fees.   14
Table 1: Timing of the Game 
Period Stage  Actions 
0 
  Neither the monopoly merchant nor the duopoly merchants accept cards. They 
set the product price, 
0 p  so as to maximize their profits. 
1 
Given 
0 p , the network sets the cardholder fee,  f , and the industry-specific 
merchant fee, m . 
2 
The merchant decides whether to accept cards or not, and determines the new 
price, 
1 p , if it chooses to accept cards.  1 
3 
The consumer decides from which merchant he or she makes purchases (if 
duopoly), which payment method he or she uses (if a cardholder), and how 
much he or she purchases (if demand is elastic).  
N   Given 
1 − N p , repeat the game in period 1. 
 
The timing of the game is described in Table 1. We consider a multi-period game and in 
each period, there are three stages: at stage 1 the network sets a merchant fee and a cardholder 
fee, at stage 2 the merchants decide whether to accept cards and their prices, and at stage 3 the 
consumers decide from which merchant they make purchases, which payment method they use, 
and how much they purchase if demand is elastic. 
3. Merchant acceptance and the highest possible merchant fees 
3.1 Monopoly merchant 
3.1.1. Inelastic demand 
In period 0, for whatever reason the monopoly merchant does not accept cards. All of its 
customers (mass 1) pay with cash. Assume that each customer makes a fixed number of 
transactions, n. The merchant profit in period 0 is: 
  n t d p m) (
0 0 − − = π ,   (1) 
                                                                                                                                                             
21Closed system networks as well as open system networks can influence both merchant fees and cardholder fees. 
See, for example, Schwartz and Vincent (2003) and Wright (2003a).   15
where 
0 p  is the product price the monopoly merchant charges in period 0. Assume that each 
consumer receives gross benefit by purchasing one unit of the product, υ . Since the monopoly 
merchant extracts the consumer’s entire surplus, it sets the product price 
0 p  so that: 
  c t p − =υ
0 . (2) 
Starting with stage 3 of period 1, a cardholder will use a card if  f tc > , and if the 
merchant accepts cards since the merchant sets a unique product price for both cash users and 
card users. That is, by using a card, the cardholder can save  0 > − f tc  per transaction as 
opposed to paying with cash. 
At stage 2 of period 1, given the merchant fee, m , charged by the network, the merchant 
decides whether to accept cards or not and determines the product price. The merchant’s profit if 
it does not accept cards is the same as the profit in period 0. Three different levels of the 
merchant’s profit from accepting cards are possible. One of them is the profit without changing 
the product price from 
0 p . Since the merchant has already extracted the cash users’ entire 
surplus, raising the price from 
0 p  implies that the merchant losses all cash customers. Another 
level of the merchant’s profit is that of when the merchant extracts the card users’ entire surplus. 
By doing so, the merchant raises the price to:  
  f t p f p c − + = − =
0 1* υ . (3) 
At this price, the merchant extracts the card users’ entire surplus but loses the entire profit from 
cash users. This level of profit, however, may not be attainable because the merchant cannot 
raise the price by a large amount in a single period. Since the realized maximum price growth 
rate is i in period 1, the price in period 1, 
1 p , cannot be higher than  ) 1 (
0 i p + . If   16
* ) 1 (
1 0 p i p < + , then the merchant cannot extract the card users’ entire surplus. The other level 
of the profit, therefore, is that when the merchant sets  ) 1 (
0 1 i p p + = . 
Given m , the merchant’s maximum profit in period 1 is defined as: 
. / ) 1 )( (   if , ) (
, / ) 1 )( (   if , ) ) 1 ( (
}, , min{ / ) 1 )( ( if , ) ( ) 1 )( (
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
α α α
α α α
α α α α π
− − − > − ≥ − − − + =
− − − > > − − − + =





t d p f t ip n m d f t p
t d p ip f t n m d i p
ip f t t d p n m d p n t d p
 (4) 
From equations 1 and 4, 
0 π π ≥
c  always holds as long as  m tm ≥ . This implies that at any of the 
three levels of the merchant’s profit, the merchant accepts cards if the merchant fee is lower than 
the merchant transactional costs with cash. From equation 4, the merchant may accept cards even 
when the merchant fee exceeds the merchant transactional costs with cash, if raising the price 
increases the merchant’s profit. 
At stage 1 of period 1, the network sets a cardholder fee,  f , which should be lower than 
the transactional costs with cash for consumers,  c t . Since, by assumption, the network 
conservatively predicts the industry’s realized maximum price growth rate is zero, the network 
sets a merchant fee, m , as high as  m t . Therefore, the highest possible merchant fee in period 1,  
  m t m =
1 . (5) 
Proposition 1 (Price and Welfare): Suppose the network sets  c t f <  and 
1 m m ≤ . A monopoly 
merchant who faces an inelastic consumer demand accepts cards. Compared to the equilibrium 
without the cards, 
a) The merchant raises the product price if the cardholder’s per transaction fee is low 
relative to his or her transaction benefits and/or the cardholder base is high enough;   17
b) Non-cardholders’ surplus is lower if the merchant raises the price, otherwise it is 
unchanged;
22 
c) Cardholders’ surplus is higher (or at least the same); 
d) Aggregate consumer surplus is lower if the merchant raises the price to its profit 
maximizing level; if the merchant raises the price to the restricted level, it is either higher 
or lower; if the merchant does not change the price it is higher; 
e) The merchant’s surplus is higher or at least the same. 
In period 2, can the network raise the merchant fee higher than the highest possible 
merchant fee in period 1? Obviously, if the merchant did not raise the price in period 1, the 
network cannot raise the merchant fee, because the game in period 2 is exactly the same as the 
game in period 1. In this case, the highest possible merchant fee in period 2, 
2 m , is the same as 
1 m . If, on the other hand, the merchant raised the price in period 1, the network can raise the 
merchant fee. Since the merchant can always go back to the original strategy (to not accept cards 
and to set the original price, 
0 p ), the new merchant fee needs to guarantee at least the same 
profit as the merchant’s profit without accepting cards. If the merchant has already extracted the 
card users’ entire surplus in period 1, the highest possible merchant fee in period 2 is: 
  ) (
1 0 2
m c m t d p f t t m − −
−




If the merchant did not extract the card users’ entire surplus in period 1 due to the pricing 
restriction, 
2 m  is lower than the level of equation 6.  
                                                 
22If a consumer has no disutility from not purchasing any goods, non-cardholders’ surplus is unchanged. Otherwise 
it is lower.   18
In the long run, if the merchants chose to serve card users only, the merchant fee 
eventually converges to the level of equation 6 and the product price also converges to the level 
of equation 3. Otherwise, the merchant fee does not change from period 1 and the price does not 
change from the initial price, 
0 p . The long-run equilibrium merchant fee and price are described 
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otherwise.                                     ,









− ≥ − − − = α α
 (8) 
Notice that if the merchant’s price setting is completely flexible (and the network knows that 
flexibility), the long-run equilibrium merchant fee will be set from the first period the merchant 
accepts cards even when the merchant chooses to serve card users only, and the long-run 
equilibrium price will be charged by the merchant from period 1. 
3.1.2 Elastic demand 
In period 0, the monopoly merchant does not accept cards. All of its customers (mass 1) 
pay with cash. Assume that each individual customer’s demand function  ) ( c t p D +  is identical 
regardless of his or her cardholding. The merchant’s profit function in period 0 is: 
 ) ( ) ( ) ( c m
nc t p D t d p p + − − = π . (9) 
The monopoly merchant sets the product price so as to maximize its profit. The price in period 0 



















Starting with stage 3 of period 1, a cardholder will use the card if  f tc >  and if the 
merchant accepts cards. At stage 2 of period 1, the merchant decides whether to accept cards; if 
it decides to accept, it adjusts the product price. The merchant’s profit if it does not accept cards 
is the same as the profit in period 0. Given a merchant fee, m , the merchant’s profit function if it 
accepts cards is defined as: 
 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 )( ( ) ; ( f p D m d p t p D t d p m p c m
c + − − + + − − − = α α π . (11) 
The merchant accepts cards if and only if  ) ( ) ; (
0 p m p
nc c π π ≥ . Although, by assumption, the 
product price growth rate is limited, since the merchant still has the freedom to set the product 
price different from 
0 p , ) ( ) ; (
0 p m p
nc c π π ≥  always holds if  ) ( ) ; (
0 0 p m p
nc c π π ≥  holds. Given 
m , the merchant’s profit maximizing price,  *
1 p , is defined as: 
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Since the product price growth rate is limited to i, the price in period 1 will be: 
 
otherwise. ), 1 (
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At stage 1 of period 1, the network sets a cardholder fee,  f , which should be lower than 
c t . Since the network conservatively predicts the industry’s maximum price growth rate is zero, 
it will set the merchant fee so that the merchant’s profit by accepting cards under 
0 p  is at least   20
as high as the profit without cards. That is  ) ( ) ; (
0 0 p m p
nc c π π ≥ . The highest merchant fee in 














− − − + = . (14) 
Equation 14 yields the following proposition.  
Proposition 2 (Merchant fee): The monopoly merchant who faces an elastic consumer demand 
accepts cards even if the merchant fee is higher than the merchant transactional benefit from 
cards.  
Proof: Clearly, the second term of equation 14 is positive. Thus,  m t m >
1 .   ■ 
Wright (2003b) analyzes merchant card acceptance in the industry where aggregate 
consumer demand is elastic and merchants are competing according to a Cournot model. The 
model also assumes that each consumer buys at most one unit in the industry. In such an 
industry, merchants will accept cards even when the merchant fee is higher than their 
transactional benefit from cards. In my model, each consumer has an elastic demand and buys as 
many units as he or she wants from the same merchant. Although a monopoly merchant does not 
have to compete, the merchant will accept cards even when the merchant fee is higher than their 
transactional benefit. This is because the merchant can make the cardholder’s demand curve shift 
upward by accepting cards. 
Since general results are not available for the case of elastic consumer demand, the rest of 
this subsection restricts its attention to linear demand. Proposition 3 compares the product price 
with and without the cards and Proposition 4 summaries the consumers’ and merchant’s welfare. 
Proposition 3 (Price): A monopoly merchant who faces linear consumer demand will adjust the 
product price if it accepts cards.   21
i) For 
1 m m tm ≤ ≤ , the product price with cards is higher if  0 > i . 
ii) For  m t m < : if  f t t c m − < , the product price with cards is higher when  0 > i ; if  f t t c m − ≥ , 
for  ) ( f t t m c m − − >  the product price with cards is higher if  0 > i  and for  ) ( f t t m c m − − <  the 
product price with cards is lower. 
Proof: From equations 10 and 12,  
  )} ( ) {(
2
*
0 1 f t t m p p c m − + − = −
α
. (15) 
By assumption  f tc > . Obviously, 
0 1* p p >  when  m t m ≥ . When  m t m < , if  f tc −  is greater 
than  m tm − , 
0 1* p p > , otherwise 
0 1* p p ≤ .   ■ 
Proposition 4 (Welfare): Suppose the network sets  c t f <  and 
1 m m ≤ . A monopoly merchant 
who faces linear demand accepts cards. Compared to the equilibrium without cards: 
a) Non-cardholders’ surplus is higher (lower) if the merchant sets a lower (higher) price 
after accepting cards; 
b) Cardholders’ surplus is higher; 
c) Aggregate consumer surplus is higher; 
d) The merchant’s surplus is higher (or at least the same). 
Proof: The consumers’ surplus is measured by using the Marshallian demand curve. Non-
cardholders’ surplus depends only on the product price. The higher the price, the lower the non-
cardholders’ surplus is. Therefore, if the product price with cards is higher than that without 
cards, non-cardholders are worse off and vise versa.  
Cardholders’ surplus depends on the product price, the cardholder’s per transaction fee, 
and the consumer’s transactional costs with cash. The total costs for a cardholder when he or she   22
uses a card,  f p +
1 , is always lower than the total costs for the cardholder when the merchant 
does not accept cards,  c t p +
0 . To show this, suppose that the network sets the highest merchant 
fee so that the merchant accepts cards with the good price, 
0 p . Suppose also that the merchant 
can charge the profit maximizing price in period 1, which is  . *
1 p  The profit maximizing 
product price is also the highest, because  0 / *
1 > ∂ ∂ m p  from equation 12. At this highest price, 
1 p , the following equation holds.  
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t p D c α , and  f tc > , equation 16 is negative. This implies that  f p +
1  is 
always lower than  c t p +
0 , and therefore cardholders are always better off. 
Denote  ) (⋅ v is a consumer’s surplus. Aggregate consumers’ surplus without cards, 
) (
0
c t p v + , is lower than aggregate consumers’ surplus when the merchant accepts cards and sets 
the product price at the highest level,  ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
1 1 f p v t p v c + + + − α α .  
0 )} 1 (
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By assumption, the network sets the merchant fee at most as high as the level that makes 
the merchant’s profit with cards equal to the profit without cards, under the price of 
0 p . Since 
the merchant will adjust the price after deciding to accept cards, the merchant’s profit should be 
at least as high as the profit without cards. From equation 13, 
0 1 p p >  when 
1 m m = , unless 
0 = i , the merchant is better off.   ■   23
Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the merchant’s card acceptance impacts the welfare of 
non-cardholders, cardholders, and the merchant differently. While cardholders and the monopoly 
merchant are always better off, non-cardholders are likely worse off. Even when the network sets 
the merchant fee lower than the merchant transactional benefit, non-cardholders are likely worse 
off. If cardholders’ net transactional benefit from cards,  f tc − , is greater than the merchant’s 
transactional benefit from cards,  m t , non-cardholders are always worse off, unless  0 = i . This 
result supports the findings of Schwartz and Vincent (2003). They compare the equilibrium with 
and without the no-surcharge rules and show that when a monopoly network charges a profit 
maximizing merchant fee from a monopoly merchant, cash users’ (non-cardholders’) surplus is 
lower under no-surcharge than under surcharge. Since cash users’ surplus at the equilibrium 
without cards and that at the equilibrium with cards under surcharge are the same, my results 
suggest that even when the network charges a merchant fee that is lower than the profit-
maximizing level, cash users’ surplus is lower under no-surcharge than under surcharge.  
Now, let us consider the game in period 2. Suppose in period 1 the network sets the 
merchant fee, 
1 m . Can the network raise the merchant fee higher than 
1 m , without changing the 
cardholder fee? If the realized maximum price growth rate in period 1 were greater than zero, the 
merchant raised the price to increase his profit under 
1 m . Thus, by definition, 
) ( ) ; ( ) ; (
0 1 0 1 1 p m p m p
nc c c π π π = > . The network can set 
2 m , such that 
1 2 m m > , to make the 
merchant’s profit with cards equal to the maximum profit without cards: 
  ) ( ) ; (
0 2 1 p m p
nc c π π = . (17)   24
If the realized maximum price growth rate in period 1 was zero, the product price in period 1 was 
the same as the price in period 0. Since  ) ( ) ; ( ) ; (
0 1 0 1 1 p m p m p
nc c c π π π = = , the network cannot 
raise the merchant fee higher than 
1 m .  
The merchant will continue to accept cards and adjust the price to maximize profit with 
the merchant fee, 
2 m .  
  ) ( ) ; ( ) ; (
0 2 1 2 2 p m p m p
nc c c π π π = ≥  (18) 
Since 
1 2 m m ≥ , the merchant’s profit in period 2 is equal to or lower than that in period 1: 
  ) ; ( ) ; (
1 1 2 2 m p m p
c c π π ≤  (19) 
In the long run, the highest merchant fee and the product price will gradually increase:
23 
 
N N m m m m ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
−1 2 1 K , 
 
N N p p p p ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
−1 2 1 K , 
and the merchant’s profit converges to the maximum profit without cards: 
  ) ( ) ; (
0 p m p
nc N N N c π π ⎯ ⎯→ ⎯
∞ → . (20) 
Proposition 5 (Long-run equilibrium): Suppose that the network will set the (conservative) 
highest merchant discount fee every period. Compared to the equilibrium without the cards, at 
the long run equilibrium: 
a) Non-cardholders are worse off; 
b) Cardholders are better off; 
c) Aggregate consumer surplus is higher; 
d) The merchant is indifferent. 
                                                 
23Notice that if the merchant’s price setting is completely flexible and the network knows that flexibility, the long-
run equilibrium defined above can be reached from the first period that the merchant accepts cards.    25
Proof: (a) is obvious since 
N p  is higher than 
0 p . (d) is obvious from equation 20. The proof of 
(b) and (c) are in Appendix A.  ■ 
In the long run, in monopoly markets with inelastic consumer demands, all participants 
are at most indifferent with and without cards. On the other hand, in monopoly markets with 
elastic consumer demands, although non-cardholders and the merchant are at most indifferent 
with and without cards, cardholders are better off. Moreover, cardholders’ welfare gain surpasses 
non-cardholders’ welfare loss from card acceptance, and therefore the sum of consumers’ and the 
merchants’ surplus is higher with cards than without cards. 
3.2 Duopoly merchants—Hotelling competition 
Additional assumptions are made for this section. There are two merchants, Merchant A 
and Merchant B, who are competing with each other according to the Hotelling model. 
Consumers (mass 1) are uniformly distributed on the interval of [0, 1], which is independent of 
their cardholding. Merchant A is located at point 0 and Merchant B is located at point 1. For the 
consumer located at point  x, where  1 0 ≤ ≤ x , the transportation cost to Merchant A is tx, and 
the transportation cost to Merchant B is  ) 1 ( x t − . Only pure strategy Nash equilibria are 
considered in this section. 
3.2.1 Inelastic demand 
Before considering the equilibrium with cards, first we describe the equilibrium without 
cards (equilibrium in period 0). As is usual in the symmetric Hotelling model, the equilibrium 
prices, ) , (
0 0
B A p p , are the same for both merchants and are equal to the merchant’s marginal cost, 
m t d + , plus the transportation cost, t:  
  t t d p p p m B A + + = = =
0 0 0 . (21)   26
Each merchant’s profit is equal to the margin times the market share: 
 
2
0 0 0 t
B A = = = π π π . (22) 
Now, let us consider the equilibrium in period 1. At stage 3 of period 1, a non-cardholder 
chooses the merchant based on the prices. If  f tc > , a cardholder chooses the merchant based on 
the merchants’ card acceptance and their prices. If the cardholder chooses the merchant who 
does not accept cards he or she uses cash, otherwise the cardholder pays with a card. If  f tc ≤ , 
the cardholder acts as if he or she is a non-cardholder.  
Suppose  f tc > . At stage 2 of period 1 the merchants decide whether to accept cards and 
determine the product prices. First, let us describe the cases where both merchants take the same 
card acceptance strategy. Suppose that the merchants accept cards. Given the other merchant’s 
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Since the merchants cannot raise the product prices by more than the price growth rate, i, in 
period 1, their pricing and profits are dependent on i. Merchant l’s price in period 1 is: 
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 (24) 
Merchant l’s profit is: 
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 (25)   27
Suppose instead that the merchants do not accept cards. In this case, the equilibrium is the same 
as the equilibrium without cards.  
Next, let us describe the cases where each merchant takes a different card acceptance 
strategy from its rival’s. Suppose that Merchant A accepts cards and Merchant B does not. Each 
merchant’s profit function depends on  f tc −  and t. If the ratio of a cardholder’s net benefit 
from a card transaction to the transportation costs,  t f tc / ) ( − , is large, the cardholder’s merchant 
choice does not depend on the price difference but depends on the difference of merchant card 
acceptance. The analysis below focuses on  2 / ) ( ≤ − t f tc .
24 
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+ − − − = α α π . (27) 
The product price and profit for each of the merchants are dependent on the industry’s realized 
maximum price growth rate: 
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24The other cases might be more important. In the United States, many of the card issuers give rewards to their 
cardholders, thus negative f is very popular. In addition, some of the merchant markets are very competitive, thus t 
may be very small in such markets.    28
otherwise.                                                                                           
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Consider Merchant A’s card acceptance behavior. Suppose that Merchant B accepts 
cards. Merchant A will accept cards if and only if  accept) reject; ( accept) accept; ( A A π π ≥ . This is 
equivalent to the merchant fee being lower than  1 m , where  1 m  is defined as: 
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Suppose instead that Merchant B does not accept cards. Merchant A will accept cards if and only 
if  reject) reject; ( reject) accept; ( A A π π ≥ . This is equivalent to  2 m m ≤ , where  2 m  is defined as: 
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From equations 32 and 33,  2 1 m m >  always holds.   29
Since Merchants A and B are identical, Merchant A’s card acceptance behavior described 
above is also applicable to Merchant B. Thus, pure strategy Nash equilibria are defined as 
follows: When the merchant fee is higher than  1 m , there is one Nash equilibrium—both 
merchants do not accept cards; when the merchant fee is between  1 m  and  2 m , there are two Nash 
equilibria—both merchants do not accept cards, or both accept cards; when the merchant fee is 
lower than  2 m , there is one Nash equilibrium—both merchants accept cards. 
At stage 1 of period 1, the network sets a cardholder fee,  f , such that  c t f < . It also sets 
the merchant fee, m , so that both merchants accept cards. Since the network cannot observe the 
industry’s realized maximum price growth rate, i, when it sets the merchant fee, it predicts i to 
be zero. From equations 32 and 33, when  0 = i : 
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In order to have both of the merchants accept cards, the network will set the merchant fee lower 
than either  1 m  or  2 m . While a unique Nash equilibrium in which both of the merchants accept 
cards exists when the network sets the merchant fee lower than  2 m , two Nash equilibria—either 
both accept cards or both do not accept cards—exist when the network sets the merchant fee 
lower than  1 m  but higher than  2 m . Since neither merchant previously accepted cards, each 
merchant hardly believes that his rival merchant will accept cards when “both do not accept 
cards” can be an equilibrium. Such merchant’s belief makes the conservative network set  2 m  as 
the highest merchant fee in period 1. The highest merchant fee in period 1, 
1 m , is therefore:   30
 












Proposition 6 (Merchant fee): In the industry whose aggregate consumer demand is inelastic, 
the duopoly merchants competing according to the Hotelling model accept cards even if the 
merchant fee is higher than the merchant transactional benefit from cards.  
Proposition 6 implies that the merchants’ strategic motive to accept cards enables the 
network to raise the merchant fee higher than the fee for a monopoly merchant. While the 
network charges the merchant fee to a monopoly merchant who faces an inelastic demand as 
high as  m t  in period 1, the fee it charges duopoly merchants who face the same aggregate 
consumer demand as the monopoly merchant is higher than  m t  in period 1. 
Since both merchants accept cards for any 
1 m m ≤ , the new product prices  ) , (
1 1
B A p p  are 
given in equation 24. Clearly, if  m t m > , the merchants raise the product prices unless  0 = i , and 
if  m t m <  the merchants lower the prices even when  0 > i .  
Proposition 7 (Welfare): Suppose the network sets  c t f <  and 
1 m m ≤ . In the industry whose 
aggregate consumer demand is inelastic, the duopoly merchants who are competing in the 
Hotelling model accept cards. Compared to the equilibrium without cards: 
a) Non-cardholders’ surplus is lower (higher) if the merchants set higher (lower) product 
prices; 
b) Cardholders’ surplus is higher; 
c) Aggregate consumers’ surplus is higher; 
d) The merchants’ surplus is lower or at most the same.   31
Proof: Since consumer demand is elastic, assume that each consumer receives gross benefit by 
purchasing one unit of the product, υ . The net utility is, therefore,  c t p − − υ  for a cash 
transaction and  f p − − υ  for a card transaction.  
From equation 24, if  0 > i , the new prices are higher (lower) when the merchant fee is 
higher (lower) than the transactional costs with cash. Since the non-cardholders’ surplus depends 
only on the product price, if the product price with cards is higher than that without cards, non-
cardholders are worse off and vise versa.  
The total cost for a cardholder when he or she uses a card,  f p +
1 , is always lower than 
the total cost for the cardholder when the merchants do not accept cards,  c t p +
0 . The merchant 
will set the price to at most 
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Aggregate consumers’ surplus without cards is  c t p − −
0 υ , and that with cards and 
product price 
1 p  is  ) ( ) )( 1 (
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υ υ α υ α .  
From equations 22 and 25, if the merchants can adjust their prices to their profit 
maximizing level (either  m t m ≤ , or  m t m >  and  ) (
0
m t m ip − ≥α ), the merchants’ profits are 
unchanged, otherwise their profits are lower.  ■ 
Let us turn to the game in period 2. Can the card network raise the merchant fee higher 
than the highest merchant fee in period 1? In contrast to monopoly merchants, duopoly   32
merchants cannot go back to the original strategy easily. Given the fact that the other merchant is 
now accepting cards, “continue to accept cards” is the better strategy than “reject cards,” as long 
as the merchant fee is lower than the level detailed below. 
Suppose that both merchants accepted cards and raised their prices in period 1. Consider 
the case where one of the merchants rejects cards and the other continues to accept cards in 
period 2. The profit for the merchant who continues to accept cards is given as: 
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Even if the realized maximum price growth rate in period 2 is zero, as long as the merchant fee 
in period 2 is lower that  3 m , where  3 m  is defined as: 
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reject)   reject; ( reject)   accept; (
t
l l = ≥ π π . This implies that when the network sets the merchant 
fee lower than  3 m , both merchants continue to accept cards. Since 
0 1 p p > ,  3 m  is higher than 
the highest merchant fee in period 1. If the network wants to have a unique Nash equilibrium 
where both merchants accept cards, then the highest merchant fee the network can charge is  3 m . 
Thus, if both of the merchants raised their prices in period 1, the network can raise the merchant 
fee in period 2.   33
Suppose, instead, that both merchants accepted cards but did not raise their prices in 
period 1 (i.e., the realized maximum price growth rate in period 1 was zero). In this case, if the 
network wants to have a unique equilibrium where both merchants accept cards, then the highest 
merchant fee the network can charge is the same as 
1 m . Nevertheless, the network may raise the 
merchant fee in period 2 because the network may not want to have such a unique equilibrium. 
In period 1, since neither merchant had previously accepted cards, each merchant hardly believed 
that his rival merchant would accept cards when “both do not accept cards” can be an 
equilibrium. In period 2, however, since both merchants have accepted cards in period 1, each 
merchant may believe that his rival will continue to accept cards when “both merchants continue 
to accept cards” can be an equilibrium. The merchants’ change in perception enables the network 
to charge a merchant fee as high as  1 m , which is defined in equation 34. Notice that 
1
1 m m > . 
Thus, even when the merchants did not raise their product prices, if each of the merchants 
strongly believes that its rival will accept cards in period 2, the network can raise the merchant 
fee in period 2. 
In period 2, both merchants will continue to accept cards and raise their prices according 
to the merchant fee increase unless the realized maximum price growth rate in the period is zero. 
The increase in product prices enables the network to raise the merchant fee further in the 
succeeding periods. In this way, the merchant fee and product prices gradually increase. In the 
long run, both the merchant fee and product prices converge to the point where they cannot 
increase anymore. The long run equilibrium merchant fee and product prices are defined as: 
  f t t m c m
N − + = , (39) 




A − + + + = = = α . (40)   34
In the long run, each of the merchants believes more strongly that its rival will continue to accept 
cards when “both continue to accept cards” can be an equilibrium. Therefore, the network can set 
the merchant fee in the range where there exist multiple Nash equilibria that include an 
equilibrium in which both merchants accept cards. In addition, in the long run, as the product 
prices increase, the merchants’ price restrictions become less restrictive so that the merchants can 
set their profit maximizing prices. 
Notice that the long-run equilibrium merchant fee is the same as what Rochet and Tirole 
(2002) found. In their model, the merchants’ price setting is completely flexible. In my model, 
however, even if the merchants’ price setting is completely flexible, the network may not set the 
long-run equilibrium merchant fee in the first period. This is because the conservative network 
wants to make sure that both of the merchants accept cards in period 1, and by doing so it avoids 
setting a merchant fee which may lead to the equilibrium where both do not accept cards.  
Proposition 8 (Long-run equilibrium): Suppose that the network will set the (conservative) 
highest merchant fee in every period. Compared to the equilibrium without cards, at the long run 
equilibrium: 
a) Non-cardholders are worse off; 
b) Cardholders are better off; 
c) Aggregate consumers’ surplus is the same; 
d) The merchant is indifferent. 
Proof: (a) It is obvious since 
0 p p
N > . (b) From equations 21 and 40,  c
N t p f p + < +
0 . (c) 
0 )} ( ) {( ) ( )} ( ) )( 1 {(





N α υ υ α υ α . (d) It is 
obvious from equations 22 and 25.  ■   35
Merchant competition allows the network to set merchant fees higher. In industries 
whose aggregate consumer demand is inelastic, the network can charge monopoly merchants the 
merchant fees as high as the merchants’ transactional benefits from cards or in some 
circumstances it can charge the fees higher than the merchants’ transactional benefits. If the 
same industries are more competitive, the network can always charge the merchant fees higher 
than the merchants’ transactional benefits. And in the long run it charges the fees that are equal 
to the merchants’ transactional benefits plus card users’ net transactional benefits. Moreover, in a 
competitive market where each merchant’s initial profit margin, t, is smaller than the card user’s 
net benefit,  f tc − , the long-run merchant fee exceeds the sum of the merchants’ transactional 
benefit and the merchants’ initial margin. In either monopoly or competitive markets, in the long 
run, the sum of consumers’ and merchants’ surpluses with cards converges to the sum of their 
surpluses without cards.  
3.2.2 Elastic demand 
In order to make the model analytically solvable, we modify the Hotelling model in the 
following way. We assume that a consumer buys at least one unit of product per trip. The 
consumer chooses a merchant based on the total cost—the sum of the product price, the 
transactional cost with the payment instrument he or she uses, and transportation cost. After the 
consumer decides from which merchant to purchase the products, the consumer determines the 
quantity based on the product price and the transactional cost. 
Before considering the equilibrium with cards, first we describe the equilibrium without 
cards. This modified Hotelling model gives the equilibrium prices,  ) , (
0 0
B A p p , which are the same 
for both merchants.   36
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Each merchant’s profit is: 
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Now consider equilibrium with cards. In order to make the model analytically solvable, 
the merchant’s decision-making is broken into two steps. First, the merchants decide whether to 
accept cards before determining their prices. Second, after observing each other’s card 
acceptance strategy, they determine their prices. This assumption may make the highest 
merchant fee the network will charge slightly lower in each period, compared with the model 
where the merchants decide their card acceptance and prices at the same time.  
Suppose  f tc > . At stage 3 of period 1, a cardholder chooses the merchant based on the 
merchants’ card acceptance and prices. If the cardholder chooses the merchant who does not 
accept card, he or she pays with cash, otherwise he or she pays with a card. Similar to the case 
where consumer demand is inelastic, merchant card acceptance and pricing behavior depend on 
the parameter values. Here, we analyze equilibrium only for  1 / ) ( ≤ − t f tc . 
At stage 2 of period 1, first let us suppose both merchants take the same card acceptance 
strategy. Given m , each merchant’s profit when both merchants accept cards under price 
0 p  is: 
  B   A, for     ), (
2
) ( ) ( )
2
1
)( ( accept)   accept; (
0 0 0 0 = + − − + +
−
− − = l f p D m d p t p D t d p c m l
α α
π ,(43) 
and when both merchants reject the cards under price 
0 p  is: 
  ) ( ) (
2
1
reject)   reject; (
0 0
c m l t p D t d p + − − = π .   (44)   37
Suppose instead a merchant takes a different card acceptance strategy from its rival’s. Consider 
the case where Merchant A accepts cards and Merchant B does not. Merchant A’s profit is: 
  ) ( )
2 2
1
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1
)( ( reject) accept; (
0 0 0 0 f p D
t
f t
m d p t p D t d p
c
c m A +
−
+ − − + +
−
− − = α
α
π ,(45) 
and Merchant B’s profit is: 
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0 . (48) 
Define  1 m  and  2 m  that satisfy the equality in equations 47 and 48. Clearly,  1 m  is greater than 
2 m . When the merchant fee is higher than  1 m , there is one Nash equilibrium; both merchants do 
not accept cards. When the merchant fee is between  1 m  and  2 m , there are two Nash equilibria; 
both merchants do not accept cards, or both accept cards. When the merchant fee is lower than 
2 m  there is one Nash equilibrium; both merchants accept cards. 
Since the network wants as many merchants to accept cards as possible, it will set a 
merchant fee lower than  2 m . The highest merchant fee in period 1, 


















− − − + = .  
Proposition 9 (Merchant fee): In the industry whose aggregate consumer demand is elastic, the 
duopoly merchants competing in the (modified) Hotelling model accept cards even if the   38
merchant fee is higher than the merchant transactional benefit from cards. If all parameter 
values are the same (t, tc, tm, f, and the demand function), the ratio of the first-period highest 
merchant fee to the initial equilibrium price, 
0 1 p m , in the duopoly market with elastic 
consumer demand is higher than that in the monopoly market with elastic consumer demand or 
in the duopoly market with inelastic consumer demand.  
For many of the card transactions, merchant fees are set as a rate of the transaction value, 
which is equivalent to some percentage of the price. Proposition 9 implies that in the market 
whose aggregate demand is elastic, the more competitive the market, the higher the merchant fee 
rate is and that in the competitive market, the more elastic the consumer demand, the higher the 
merchant fee rate is. 
After deciding card acceptance, both merchants set their prices. The profit maximizing 
prices are defined as: 
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1 x p D x D + = and ) * ( ) (
1 x p D x D + ′ = ′ . Since the product price growth rate is limited 
to i, the price in period 1 will be: 
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Since general results are not available for the case of elastic consumer demand, the rest of the 
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where bp a p D − = ) ( ,) } * ( ) * ( { )} * ( ) * ( ){ 1 (
1 1 1 1 f p D t f p D t p D t t p D A c c + ′ − + + + ′ − + − = α α , 
and ) ( ) (
0 0
c c t p D t t p D B + ′ − + = . This provides the following proposition. 
Proposition 10 (Price): In the industry whose aggregate consumer demand is elastic, the 
duopoly merchants competing in the (modified) Hotelling model will adjust the product prices 
according to the merchant fee, if they accept cards.  
i) For 
1 m m tm ≤ ≤ , the good price with cards is higher if  0 > i . 
ii) For  m t m < , if  δ ) ( f t t c m − < , where 
} ) ( }{ ) ( {
1 0
2 2
bt f p D bt t p D
t b
c + + + +
= δ , and if  0 > i  the 
good price with cards is higher; if δ ) ( f t t c m − ≥ , for  δ ) ( f t t m c m − − >  the good price with 
cards is higher if  0 > i  and for  δ ) ( f t t m c m − − <  the good price with cards is lower. 
Similar to the monopoly merchant, the duopoly merchants will set product prices higher 
than the equilibrium prices without cards even when the merchant fee is lower than their 
transactional benefits. However, competition narrows the range of merchant fees that allows 
merchants to set the higher product prices. A monopoly merchant will set a higher product price 
when the merchant fee is higher than  ) ( f t t c m − − . On the other hand, duopoly merchants will 
set higher product prices when the merchant fee is higher than  δ ) ( f t t c m − − , which is higher 
than ) ( f t t c m − − .  
Proposition 11 (Welfare): Suppose the network sets  c t f <  and 
1 m m ≤ . In the industry whose 
aggregate consumer demand is elastic, the duopoly merchants who are competing in the 
Hotelling model accept cards. Compared to the equilibrium without cards: 
a) Non-cardholders’ surplus is higher (lower) if the merchant sets a lower (higher) price 
after accepting cards;   40
b) Cardholders’ surplus is higher; 
c) Aggregate consumers’ surplus is higher; 
d) The merchants’ surplus is higher.  
Proof: See appendix A.  
From the results of 3.1.2 and 3.2.1, it is not hard to imagine that the network will raise the 
merchant fee in the periods after both merchants accept cards. In the long run, the merchant fee 
will converge to the highest possible merchant fee and the product prices will also converge 
accordingly. Under such merchant fee and product prices, the merchant’s profit with cards 
becomes the same as the equilibrium profit without cards.  
4. Conclusion 
A large group of merchants accept cards even when their transactional benefit from cards 
is lower than the fee they pay, as long as a card user’s net transactional benefits are positive. 
Only monopoly merchants who are facing an inelastic consumer demand may deny cards when 
the fee exceeds its transactional benefit. Typically, card users are not charged a per transaction 
fee for credit card transactions, rather many of them receive rewards from their card issuers. For 
debit card transactions, some issuers charge a per transaction fee to their cardholders, but at least 
in the United States, such issuers are in the minority.
25 Thus, it is likely that cardholder’s net 
transactional benefits are positive even when their gross transactional benefits are zero or even 
negative. This suggests that the analyses based on the assumption that merchants accept cards 
only when their transactional benefits from cards surpass their fees are potentially misleading.  
                                                 
25According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s report to the Congress on the disclosure of 
point-of-sale debit fees, 14 percent of depository institutions charge PIN fees for some of their customers. According 
to the same report, 13 percent of households reported that their depository institutions charge PIN fees.    41
Although whether the network has an incentive to charge the highest possible merchant 
fee or not is in question, if it does, it will charge the fee as high as the sum of the merchant’s 
transactional benefit and the cardholder’s net transactional benefits including rewards. The 
network may not charge the highest fees in earlier periods of card acceptance in a given industry 
but it will gradually increase the fee to the highest possible level.  
Merchant competition allows the network to set higher merchant fees. The network can 
always set higher merchant fees in more competitive markets. Moreover, in competitive markets 
the merchant fees in the long run may exceed the sum of the merchant’s initial margin and the 
merchant’s transactional benefit.  
The highest possible merchant fees may be more efficient than the case without cards, if 
the real cost of processing card transactions is lower than the sum of the merchant’s and the 
consumer’s transactional costs with the other payment instruments. However, these fees 
potentially create inequality among consumers. While debit cards are more accessible to all 
consumers, credit cards are not.
26 In the United States, about 75 percent of families are estimated 
to hold at least one credit card.
27 In order to have a credit card, a consumer needs to meet various 
criteria, such as income, credit history, and so on. These criteria are necessary for banks as well 
as for society to have safe and sound payment systems. However, sometimes credit cards are 
used simply as a transactional means rather than as a tool for borrowing.
28 If higher credit card 
merchant fees imply higher product prices, those who cannot have a credit card need to pay 
higher prices. Cardholders also pay higher prices but they are compensated for that by receiving 
rewards. 
                                                 
26According to the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) conducted by the Federal Reserve System in 2001, about 13 
percent of US families did not have a checking account. About 20 percent of such families did not have enough 
money or have credit problems. 
27According to the SCF (2001).   42
The results obtained in this paper may depend on the assumption of a monopoly card 
network. The network does not have to compete for merchants, for consumers, and/or for issuers. 
Does competition among networks lower merchant fees? The answer requires a formal analysis; 
however, a pessimistic speculation would be that network competition does not reduce merchant 
fees. One study reported that consumers are beginning to hold fewer cards, given universal 
acceptance of credit/debit cards by merchants.
29 Since typical merchant fees consist of per 
transaction fees and negligible fixed fees, merchants accept as many networks’ cards as they can. 
Merchants are generally hesitant to reject customers’ payment choices. Although they may steer 
customers from one payment instrument to another, in the case that their customers are not 
willing to use the merchant’s preferred method of payment, they accept other payments to satisfy 
their customers. This sort of merchant behavior may have little effect on a network’s pricing 
decision. As long as the merchant fee does not exceed the level that gives merchants negative 
profits, merchants may have no choice but to continue accepting cards. 
                                                                                                                                                             
28According to the SCF (2001), about 40 percent of cardholding families did not borrow on credit cards.  
29The 2004 Preferred Card Study conducted by Edger, Dunn & Company. See www.edgardunn.com/eletter/2004-
02/.   43
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Appendix A: 
(1) Proof of Proposition 5 (b) and (c) 
Given merchant fee, 
N m   
  )} ( ) ( {
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N − + − + − + + = α . (A1) 
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From equation A3,  
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(2) Proof of Proposition 11 
(a) is obvious from proposition 10. (b) It is equivalent to show  c t p f p + < +
0 1  at 
1 m m = . 
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(c) To show this, first we show that aggregate quantities demand has increased at 
1 m m = . 
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The difference of aggregate consumers’ surplus with and without cards is:  
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(d) From the results of 3.1.2 and 3.2.1, this is likely.   ■ 
 